I have in mind here topics such as hope and dying or what might make for a good death. For example, while we have five chapters in Part I devoted to questions of the nature of death itself there is little covering work on dying as an experience or as a process. That being said, by taking the approach that each of the fourteen chapters must contribute to one of the four general topics corresponding to each Part, there is a notable lack of discussion of some of the issues that have arisen in end of life ethics that fall outside these four basic themes. The approach the work takes allows the space and scope for many of the individual authors to provide the reader with an excellent survey and up-to-date analysis of the debate in some of the most important topics in this field. Each chapter also opens with a short summary.Īlthough most of the issues cover well-trodden ground, this should not necessarily be seen as a point of criticism as to the usefulness or merits of the collection. ![]() There is no general editorial discussion or introduction for each Part but Davis does provide a short introduction to the book as a whole, presenting a brief but useful summary of the central arguments offered by each author. Individual chapters then address specific topics that fall under the more general theme of the Part in which they are contained. The book has four Parts, each covering a general topic area in end of life ethics: the nature of death who should make end of life decisions means of ending life and the role of other parties at the end of life. ![]() Davis' edited collection on the theme of ethics at the end of life provides us with fourteen newly written chapters, many from names that those familiar with this area will doubtless recognise. Also, it is not necessarily inconceivable that plants, relatively simple machines, or even fundamental physical processes, can experience pleasure or pain, although there are very few proponents of these views.John K. Some philosophers argue that sufficiently advanced artificial intelligence would be capable of experiencing these feelings, or that sufficiently detailed computer simulations of people would have the same experiences that flesh-and-blood people do. Third, it is possible that beings other than human and nonhuman animals are sentient (see artificial sentience ). A conservative cut-off of this sort might include only primates, and a liberal cut-off might go so far as to include insects. This is the most common view: that other creatures such as chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs also have internal experiences, but that there is some cut-off point beyond which species such as clams, jellyfish, and sea-sponges lie. Second, it is possible that only sufficiently advanced nonhuman animals are sentient (see animal sentience ). For instance, the 17th- century philosopher René Descartes put forward influential arguments to the effect that animals lack internal experience, and until several decades ago animal experimenters and veterinarians were taught to disregard apparent pain responses. This is currently an uncommon view, although it has a long history. ![]() ![]() Philosophers and scientists discuss three broad hypotheses on what entities are sentient.įirst, it is possible that only humans are sentient. Views about the distribution of sentience (Sometimes the term is used more narrowly to refer to the capacity to feel pleasure or pain.) It is generally accepted that possessing this capacity is a necessary condition for counting as a moral patient. Sentience is the capacity to feel, or have conscious experience.
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